Yglesias’s Faulty Economics

Matt Yglesias just penned a post in defense of Mitt Romney’s tax plan but I think he mixes up the economics quite a bit. He writes:

The good thing about taxes is they raise revenue, which can be used to do useful things. The bad thing about taxes is they may be a drag on economic growth. But here there are two considerations. One is the “incentive effect” of taxes—higher taxes mean less incentive to do economically valuable things. The other is the “income effect”—less money in your pocket means more incentive to do economically valuable things. The genius of Romney’s plan is that by eliminating deductions it leaves middle class families with less money in their pockets (so a pro-growth income effect) while also lowering the tax rate they pay on a marginal dollar of additional earnings (so a pro-growth incentive effect). Basically it’s a huge win. You get a bunch of revenue in a way that bolsters the country’s growth prospects.

Let’st start at the beginning. The first part about taxes raising revenue and hurting growth is correct. But then it gets murky. Yglesias writes “higher taxes mean less incentive to do economically valuable things” and just a line later says, “less money in your pocket means more incentive to do economically valuable things.” But higher taxes means less money in your pocket. They are different ways of saying the same thing. Yet, Yglesias comes to different conclusions for their effects on economic growth.

I understand his train of thought here. A lower marginal tax rate allows people to keep a larger amount of their income. However, fewer deductions allows them to keep a smaller amount of their income. And if the middle class pays more taxes overall (as Romney’s plan does), that means they are keeping a lower share of their income overall and paying a higher effective tax rate. However, this says nothing about whether people will work more or less (which is what I assume Yglesias means by “do economically valuable things”).

Here, there are two different effects: the “income effect” and “substitution effect.” The income effect says that because  the middle class has less after-tax income, people will work more to make-up for their lost earnings. The substitution effect, on the other hand, says that because the middle class will keep a smaller percent of each dollar they earn (remember, overall they are paying more in taxes), they will work less. The question is, which effect dominates the other? If the income effect is a larger, people will work more (or do more economically valuable things). If the opposite is true though, people will work less (or do less economically valuable things).

But we don’t necessarily know which one  would dominate; it depends on a number of different things. So it is wrong to say that it bolsters the country’s growth prospects.

Nevertheless, I agree with the rest of Yglesias’s post that using the extra revenue to pay for a lower effective tax rate on high-income earners is a bad idea. In fact, Romney’s tax plan has a number of major flaws, not to mention that it is mathematically impossible. And given that it doesn’t necessarily improve the country’s growth prospects (which are also more complicated than just the middle-class), it’s tough to defend any aspect of Romney’s plan.

Glen Hubbard: Deliberately Misleading Readers

Romney economic advisor Glen Hubbard penned an op-ed today in the Wall Street Journal that is rather infuriating. Let’s look at Hubbard’s first assertion on policy uncertainty:

In response to the recession, the Obama administration chose to emphasize costly, short-term fixes—ineffective stimulus programs, myriad housing programs that went nowhere, and a rush to invest in “green” companies.

As a consequence, uncertainty over policy—particularly over tax and regulatory policy—slowed the recovery and limited job creation. One recent study by Scott Baker and Nicholas Bloom of Stanford University and Steven Davis of the University of Chicago found that this uncertainty reduced GDP by 1.4% in 2011 alone, and that returning to pre-crisis levels of uncertainty would add about 2.3 million jobs in just 18 months.

To the study we go! Here’s the graph of economic policy uncertainty:

Uncertainty rose a bit during the stimulus debate, though that also coincided with the crisis as a whole and TARP occurred right as Lehman Brothers collapsed. It’s certainly not fair to say that those policies did not cause any uncertainty – any policy change is going to make things more uncertain. But look what is responsible for “this uncertainty [that] reduced GDP by 1.4% in 2011 alone.” It’s the debt ceiling dispute! And who was responsible for it? The Republicans! They held the economy hostage for months. That 1.4 percent reduction is exactly what Obama tried to avoid by repeatedly calling for a clean increase of the debt ceiling. Yet, Hubbard is trying to lay the blame on the President! (And by the way, can we stop with this “ineffective stimulus” idea already? It wasn’t.) Continue reading “Glen Hubbard: Deliberately Misleading Readers”

DeMarco’s One Correct Point

Liberals have been jumping on Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) leader Ed DeMarco for not allowing principal reduction for mortgages held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Such a policy would bring many homeowners above water and allow them to refinance at lower interest rates and afford their mortgages. Here’s Krugman:

In any case, however, deciding whether debt relief is a good policy for the nation as a whole is not DeMarco’s job. His job — as long as he keeps it, which I hope is a very short period of time — is to run his agency. If the Secretary of the Treasury, acting on behalf of the president, believes that it is in the national interest to spend some taxpayer funds on debt relief, in a way that actually improves the FHFA’s budget position, the agency’s director has no business deciding on his own that he prefers not to act.

I don’t know what DeMarco’s specific legal mandate is. But there is simply no way that it makes sense for an agency director to use his position to block implementation of the president’s economic policy, not because it would hurt his agency’s operations, but simply because he disagrees with that policy.

That’s 100% correct and it’s terrible that DeMarco is overstepping his bounds. However, DeMarco also made one good point:

Perhaps the greatest risk of the Enterprises’ allowing principal forgiveness is one with far more significant long-term consequences for mortgage credit availability. Fundamentally, principal forgiveness rewrites a contract in a way that other loan modification programs do not. Forgiving debt owed pursuant to a lawful, valid contract risks creating a longer-term view by investors that the mortgage contract is less secure than ever before. Longer-term, this view could lead to higher mortgage rates, a constriction in mortgage credit lending or both, outcomes that would be inconsistent with FHFA’s mandate to promote stability and liquidity in mortgage markets and access to mortgage credit.

I’ve talked about this before in using eminent domain for principal reduction. It’s a real issue that many economic bloggers are overlooking. Here’s Felix Salmon’s response: Continue reading “DeMarco’s One Correct Point”